The recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in Revenue Services Lesotho & Others v Liqhobong Mining Development Co (Pty) Ltd marks a decisive reaffirmation of the primacy of Lesotho’s statutory tax dispute-resolution framework and settles, with clarity, the long-contested question of whether the High Court may intervene to suspend payment of assessed tax pending the exhaustion of objection and appeal procedures before the Revenue Appeals Tribunal (RAT). The Court held that it may not. The decision reinforces the architecture established by the Income Tax Act 1993 and the Revenue Appeals Tribunal Act 2005, both of which embody the long-recognised “pay now, argue later” principle intrinsic to modern revenue systems.
The dispute arose from an amended assessment of approximately M62.4 million issued by Revenue Services Lesotho (RSL) against Liqhobong Mining Development Co (Pty) Ltd for the 2020–2023 tax years. Following the filing of an objection and the rejection of its application for an extension of time to pay, Liqhobong approached the High Court on an urgent basis, seeking an order suspending RSL’s enforcement of the assessment pending the outcome of its objection and any subsequent appeal to the RAT. The High Court granted interim relief, issuing a rule nisi that effectively halted the enforcement of the assessment. RSL appealed, not on the merits of the assessment itself, but solely on the jurisdictional question: whether the High Court possessed the authority to intervene at all in the face of explicit statutory mechanisms governing payment, objection, and appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that it did not. Its reasoning was rooted firmly in the statutory text. Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act provides that tax “is due and payable, and may be recovered, notwithstanding” the filing of an objection or appeal. Section 23(1) of the RAT Act likewise stipulates that the obligation to pay tax “shall not be suspended” by an appeal unless the Commissioner General or the RAT so directs. These provisions, read together, create a coherent and deliberate legislative scheme that assigns the authority to suspend payment exclusively to the Commissioner and the RAT. Nowhere does the statutory framework confer a parallel or residual power on the High Court to halt enforcement pending the taxpayer’s pursuit of statutory remedies.
The Court therefore concluded that the High Court had misdirected itself by treating the matter as one involving the preservation of the status quo, rather than as a question governed by the specific statutory machinery designed to manage tax disputes. In doing so, the High Court failed to interpret section 3 of the RAT Act holistically together with sections 23 and 143, and overlooked the significance of the legislature’s choice to establish a specialised tribunal with its own processes for granting relief. The Court emphasised that jurisdiction cannot be created by considerations of sympathy, fairness, or the financial hardship of the taxpayer. While the High Court expressed concern that enforcing payment might have drastic financial consequences for Liqhobong, the Court of Appeal observed that financial difficulty is neither uncommon nor exceptional in tax disputes. To allow such hardship to justify bypassing the statutory scheme would undermine the entire architecture of the tax system and invite widespread circumvention of the RAT.
Importantly, the Court drew a distinction between the ouster and the deferment of jurisdiction. While Parliament may not wholly remove the High Court’s constitutional authority to review administrative action, it may postpone the point at which the High Court becomes seized with jurisdiction until the specialised processes have run their course. The High Court therefore retains a role, but only at the stage of judicial review of RAT decisions or in rare cases involving allegations of illegality or ultra vires conduct that the RAT cannot remedy. The present matter did not reach that threshold. Liqhobong’s complaint was squarely within the ambit of the RAT’s powers and did not present any exceptional circumstances that would justify High Court intervention.
The Court’s analysis is consistent with regional and international jurisprudence endorsing the “pay now, argue later” principle as a mechanism necessary for fiscal stability and efficient revenue collection. The Court referenced, among others, Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for SARS in South Africa, where similar statutory provisions were upheld as constitutionally permissible and practically indispensable. The Court also drew on comparative authority dealing with the role of specialised tribunals, including labour and administrative-law contexts, to emphasise that a coherent adjudicative system requires respect for legislative design and avoidance of duplication between courts and specialist bodies.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the appeal, set aside the High Court’s assumption of jurisdiction, and confirmed that suspension of tax payments pending the resolution of objections and appeals lies exclusively within the purview of the Commissioner General and the RAT. The High Court’s interim order therefore could not stand. Condonation for the late filing of the appeal was granted, given the importance of the jurisdictional issue and the reasonable prospects of success.
This judgment carries considerable practical significance for corporate taxpayers in Lesotho, particularly entities in capital-intensive industries such as mining, telecommunications, construction, and manufacturing. It signals that urgent High Court applications seeking to suspend or delay enforcement of tax assessments will no longer be entertained. Taxpayers must instead rely on the statutory mechanisms, objection, payment-extension applications, and RAT appeals and must prepare for the reality that payment of an assessment may be enforced even while those processes are ongoing. The decision is a clear statement that the RAT is not merely an appellate body, but the primary and exclusive forum for tax disputes at the first instance.
The Court’s judgment reinforces certainty in the tax system and aligns Lesotho with international best practice in revenue administration. It underscores the importance of early engagement with RSL, strategic preparation of objections, and robust participation in RAT proceedings. At the same time, it provides clarity to government and policymakers regarding the durability of the statutory scheme and the constitutional permissibility of the “pay now, argue later” principle. For taxpayers, the message is unequivocal: statutory remedies must be exhausted before the High Court can be approached, and the suspension of tax obligations will be an exceptional occurrence confined to the mechanisms expressly laid down by Parliament.
Mayet & Associates Attorneys continues to advise clients on objections, appeals, applications for payment extensions, and judicial review proceedings arising from revenue disputes. The implications of this judgment will shape tax litigation strategy in Lesotho for years to come and demand heightened diligence from taxpayers navigating the processes of the RAT.
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