The recent decisions of the Court of Appeal of Lesotho in Rabuka Chalatse v Minister of Public Service and Others and Moletsane and Another v Standard Lesotho Bank Limited mark an important development in the Court's evolving jurisprudence concerning its exceptional power to revisit its own final judgments. Together, the decisions attempt to balance two competing principles: the finality of litigation and the interests of justice.
Historically, final judgments of an apex court have been regarded as conclusive. Nevertheless, exceptional circumstances may arise where adherence to finality would perpetuate a serious injustice. It is within this narrow space that the Court's exceptional review jurisdiction operates.
The significance of Rabuka
Rabuka provides the substantive foundation for the exceptional review jurisdiction. Drawing upon earlier authorities, the Court emphasised that review of its own judgments is not a further appeal. The jurisdiction is exceptional, corrective rather than appellate, and directed at protecting the integrity of the judicial process.
The most significant contribution of the judgment is its distinction between two categories of cases. The first concerns newly discovered evidence that merely strengthens a case unsuccessfully advanced during the original proceedings. Such circumstances ordinarily remain barred by the principle of finality. The second concerns allegations that the Court reached its decision on a materially incomplete or misleading factual foundation because relevant information already in existence was not disclosed. According to the Court, the latter situation may affect not merely the correctness of the result but the integrity of the adjudicative process itself.
The Court therefore shifted the focus from whether a judgment may have been wrong to whether the process through which it was obtained was fundamentally compromised. In doing so, it established what may be described as an “integrity of the adjudicative process” standard for exceptional review.
At the same time, Rabuka established the procedural framework governing applications of this nature. The Court described the review procedure as sui generis, requiring a petition as the principal pleading supported by a verifying affidavit. These procedural requirements were intended to serve as a filtering mechanism preventing the exceptional jurisdiction from becoming a routine response to unsuccessful appeals.
The significance of Moletsane
Moletsane represents the Court's first substantial application of the procedural framework articulated in Rabuka. The applicants sought reconsideration of an earlier Court of Appeal judgment and advanced several substantive complaints concerning the correctness of that decision. The Court, however, never reached those issues.
Instead, it held that the applicants had failed to comply with the procedural requirements identified in Rabuka. The petition had been sworn before a Commissioner of Oaths, and no separate verifying affidavit accompanied it. The Court rejected the attempt to use a single document as both petition and affidavit. It held that the petition and the verifying affidavit perform distinct procedural functions and must remain separate instruments.
The consequence was that the petition was struck from the roll without any consideration of the merits. Importantly, the Court did not determine whether the applicants had established a patent error, a fundamental error or a miscarriage of justice. It held only that the exceptional jurisdiction had not been properly invoked.
Substance and procedure
Read together, the two cases establish both the substantive and procedural dimensions of the Court's exceptional review jurisdiction. Rabuka explains when the Court may revisit one of its own judgments; Moletsane explains how litigants must seek access to that jurisdiction.
The decisions also reveal an interesting tension. Rabuka adopts a justice-centred approach focused on the integrity of the adjudicative process. Moletsane, by contrast, emphasises procedural discipline and strict compliance with the gateway requirements established in Rabuka.
Whether these approaches are truly complementary remains open to debate. One view is that strict procedural compliance is necessary to protect the finality of judgments and prevent abuse of an extraordinary remedy. Another is that excessive formalism may prevent potentially meritorious complaints from ever being considered.
Conclusion
Taken together, Rabuka and Moletsane establish the modern law governing the Court of Appeal's exceptional review jurisdiction in Lesotho. Rabuka supplies the substantive justification for reopening final judgments by focusing upon the integrity of the adjudicative process. Moletsane supplies the procedural discipline through which that exceptional jurisdiction must be accessed.
The future development of the jurisprudence is likely to centre on a single issue: whether the Court can maintain an appropriate balance between procedural discipline and the broader objective of preventing fundamental injustice.
The information provided in this article does not, and is not intended to, constitute legal advice; instead, all information, content, and materials available in this article are for general informational purposes only.
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